The central late concept from the overview, followed here in the German. The early Tractatus held that “names stand in for objects and a proposition pictures a fact.” The late Investigations makes that very “name = object” picture its target, in its opening pages.
1. The Augustinian picture of language
The Investigations opens by quoting Augustine’s Confessions: a recollection of learning words little by little, by seeing adults point at things and speak their names. Wittgenstein takes it up like this:
Diese Worte, so scheint es mir, geben uns ein bestimmtes Bild von dem Wesen der menschlichen Sprache. Nämlich dieses: Die Wörter der Sprache benennen Gegenstände — Sätze sind Verbindungen von solchen Benennungen.
These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. Namely this: the words of the language name objects; sentences are combinations of such names. (§1. German quotations throughout; Japanese and English are L/LAB working translations.)
The picture fits words like “table” and “chair” well enough. But “five”? “red”? “no”? “hello”? “if”? Wittgenstein gives the famous shopping scene: you take a slip marked “five red apples” to the shop. The grocer opens the drawer marked “apples,” matches “red” against a colour chart, and counts out apples, saying the numbers up to “five.” “But how does he operate with the word ‘five’?” — the question was how the word is used, not what it means (§1).
2. The building site — a “complete primitive language”
Picture a site where stone is carried (§2). Builder A calls out; assistant B brings the stones. Only four words are used: “block,” “pillar,” “slab,” “beam.” A says “Slab!” and B brings a slab. Wittgenstein calls this “a complete primitive language.” Is “Slab!” here an order, a name, or short for “bring me a slab”? The answer: within this language-game the distinction does no work. A word’s role is fixed by the whole exchange it is embedded in. In §8 the language grows: numerals, the demonstratives “there” and “this,” a colour chart. Language is extended from primitive games outward.
3. What a language-game is
Ich werde auch das Ganze: der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist, das »Sprachspiel« nennen.
I will also call the whole — of language and the activities into which it is woven — the “language-game.” (§7)
And §23: the term “language-game” is meant “to bring into prominence that speaking a language is part of an activity, or of a form of life (Lebensform).” §23 lists language-games — ordering, describing, reporting, forming a hypothesis, making up a story, acting a play, guessing riddles, joking, translating, asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying. “Compare their multiplicity with what logicians have said about language (including the author of this book).” A plain correction of his earlier self.
4. Meaning is use
Die Bedeutung eines Wortes ist sein Gebrauch in der Sprache.
The meaning of a word is its use in the language. (§43)
But §43 restricts this to “a large class of cases in which we use the word ‘meaning’ — though not for all cases.” “Meaning is use” is not an all-purpose definition; it is a signal to change direction. Instead of asking “what is the meaning of a word,” look at the situations in which the word is used and how.
The toolbox (§11) — hammer, pliers, saw, screwdriver, rule, glue-pot. Different shapes, different jobs. “So too with words.” The locomotive cab (§12) — the levers all look alike (they are all made to be gripped by hand). But one is a crank that turns continuously, one a switch with two settings, one a brake that bites harder the more you pull. With words too you must see past the surface “noun” and “verb” to what the word is doing.
5. Pointing does not fix meaning
The last blow to the “meaning = object” picture is the analysis of ostensive definition. Point at two nuts and say “this is ‘two’.” But the learner might take “two” to be the name of the group, or of the nuts’ colour, or of their shape, or of a direction (§28). Pointing alone does not fix what is pointed at.
Man muß schon etwas wissen (oder können), um nach der Benennung fragen zu können.
One must already know (or be able to do) something in order to be able to ask what something is called. (§30)
An ostensive definition works only “when the role the word is to play in the language-game is already clear” (§30). Pointing at the king and saying “this is the king” means nothing to someone who does not know how the piece moves (§31). Meaning is held up not by the single act of pointing but by the whole game.
6. The old city — toward the next theme
Unsere Sprache kann man ansehen als eine alte Stadt: ein Gewinkel von Gäßchen und Plätzen, alten und neuen Häusern … und dies umgeben von einer Menge neuer Vororte mit geraden und regelmäßigen Straßen.
Our language can be seen as an old city: a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses … and this surrounded by a multitude of new suburbs with straight, regular streets. (§18)
Everyday language is an old town centre grown without a plan. Words like “five,” “red,” “no” do not sit tidily anywhere. So a search for the essence common to “language” finds nothing — it finds only partly overlapping resemblances. That is the next theme: family resemblance.
In sum
| section | point |
|---|---|
| §1 | “word = name of a thing, meaning = the object” is the Augustinian picture; it fits only part of language |
| §2, §8 | the building site’s “complete primitive language”; a word’s work is fixed by the whole exchange |
| §7, §23 | a language-game = language plus the activities it is woven into; speaking is part of a “form of life” |
| §11–12 | words are tools, levers; look at function, not surface |
| §28–31 | ostensive definition works only once the role in the game is understood |
| §18 | language is an old city grown without a plan |
Connections
- “Meaning is use” rebuilds meaning from the side of parole — situated speech — in Saussure’s langue/parole terms. Where Saussure looked at the system (langue), the late Wittgenstein looks at practice.
- “Look at function, not form (noun/verb)” runs close to Sapir’s “form and function are independent” in chapters 4–5 of Language.
- The language-game idea is one foundation of later speech-act theory (Austin, Searle) and pragmatics.
The Wittgenstein feature: overview / the picture theory / the limits of language / this essay / family resemblance / following a rule.
