The talk of language-games invites an obvious objection: “you keep giving examples of language-games but never say what the essence of a language-game — and so of language — is. What is common to all these activities?” (§65, paraphrased). Wittgenstein answers it head-on.
1. “Don’t think, but look!”
Denk nicht, sondern schau!
Don’t think, but look! (§66. German quotations throughout; Japanese and English are L/LAB working translations.)
Look at what we call “games (Spiele),” Wittgenstein says — board games, card games, ball games, Olympic games, children’s ring games. “Look and see whether there is anything common to all. — For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that” (§66). Chess and tennis both have winners; solitaire has no opponent. Chess and solitaire are games of skill; snakes-and-ladders is luck. Amusement covers most, but a professional match is also work. Features “come up and disappear (tauchen auf und verschwinden).”
2. Family resemblance
Ich kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren als durch das Wort »Familienähnlichkeiten«; denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament.
I can think of no better expression to characterise these similarities than “family resemblances”; for the various resemblances between members of a family — build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament — overlap and criss-cross in the same way. (§67)
And “‘games’ form a family.” In a family photo the brother has the father’s nose, the sister the mother’s eyes, the youngest the grandfather’s brow — yet often there is no facial feature shared by all, and still you see “one family” at a glance. Wittgenstein’s thread: a thread is strong not because one long fibre runs end to end but because countless short fibres overlap (§67).
3. A concept with blurred edges
“Then the extension of ‘game’ is vague — isn’t that a defect?” Wittgenstein grants it, and turns it around.
Man kann sagen, der Begriff »Spiel« ist ein Begriff mit verschwommenen Rändern.
One can say that the concept “game” is a concept with blurred edges. (§71)
But blurred edges are not a defect. “Is a blurred photograph not often exactly what we need?” (§71). Sometimes a shot that catches the movement, slightly blurred, is more use than a sharp photo of someone standing still. You can draw an artificial boundary around a concept. But “if someone were to draw a boundary I could not acknowledge it as the one I had always wanted to draw” (§68). “Game” can be used, and is used, with no boundary drawn.
4. Explaining by examples
So when we explain “game,” we give examples and add: “these and similar things are called games” (§69). This is not “making do with examples because no real definition can be found.” It is how the concept works. Explanation by examples, Wittgenstein insists, is not an incomplete explanation (§71).
5. A blow to essentialism
The target of this blow is essentialism — the assumption that “what is X?” can be answered by one property that every instance must share. Plato’s dialogues pose “what is knowledge?” and “what is piety?” in exactly that form. Wittgenstein’s claim: many of our concepts are not like that. “Game,” “language,” “number” (mentioned at §67), “understanding” — all are held together by family resemblance.
This view fed directly into later categorisation research — Eleanor Rosch’s prototype theory, Lakoff’s cognitive linguistics. The picture in which sparrows and pigeons are central “birds” and penguins and ostriches peripheral is the psychology of family resemblance. On the linguistics side it faces the same way as Saussure’s “in a language there are only differences” (categories fixed by difference, not essence) and Sapir on parts of speech (parts of speech are the language’s cut, not nature’s).
6. “Look” — the late method itself
“Don’t think, but look” is not a slogan for family resemblance alone. It is the late Wittgenstein’s method of philosophy.
Wir dürfen keinerlei Theorie aufstellen. … Wir müssen alle Erklärung beseitigen, und nur Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten.
We may not advance any kind of theory. … We must do away with all explanation, and description alone must take its place. (§109)
Philosophy “simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything” (§126). And — “the aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity” (§129). Stop trying to dig out a definition; just look carefully at where the words are actually used. Family resemblance was the first large result of that method.
In sum
| section | point |
|---|---|
| §65–66 | answer to “what is the essence of a language-game?”: “don’t think, but look.” No common essence is visible |
| §66 | what is visible is a series of “similarities, affinities” that come up and disappear |
| §67 | that is “family resemblance”; games are one family; a thread = overlapping fibres |
| §68–71 | “game” is a concept with blurred edges; blur is not a defect and is often needed |
| §69–71 | explanation by examples is not an incomplete explanation |
| §109, §126, §129 | build no theory; describe — the late method |
Connections
- Prototype theory (Rosch, 1970s) — categories have centres and peripheries and are not defined by necessary and sufficient conditions. The experimental psychology of family resemblance.
- Anti-essentialism — “don’t look for the definition first” spread to law (the “what is art / religion?” definition problems) and aesthetics.
- Saussure and Sapir — all three moved categories from “an essence given by nature” to “a net of relations, differences, resemblances.”
The Wittgenstein feature: overview / the picture theory / the limits of language / language-games / this essay / following a rule.
